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Trajectories for the 
Immigrant Second Generation 
in New York City
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
t has become a truism to say that immigration has
 transformed American society since 1965. Beginning with 
“gateway” cities like New York and Los Angeles, the effect of 
new immigrants now extends to small pork- or chicken-
processing towns in Iowa or North Carolina. Indeed, the 
March 2004 annual demographic supplement to the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) indicates that almost 12 percent of 
America’s residents were born abroad, doubtless an 
underestimate. In places where first-generation immigrants 
concentrate, like New York City, immigrants now make up 
almost half the adult population—and in the case of Miami, 
more than three-fifths. This outcome has led scholars to 
undertake many studies of the new immigrants, for example, 
using individual traits to model individual earnings or looking 
at the school performance or health conditions of the children 
of immigrants.
One leading researcher, George Borjas, has warned that the 
relatively low skill levels of recent immigrants bode poorly for 
their lifetime earnings and chances for upward mobility (Borjas 
1990, 1999). Incorporating new immigrant ethnic groups also 
poses many other challenges, such as heightened tensions 
among ethnic and racial groups (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001). 
Despite problematic aspects of the effect of immigration, 
however, many observers, including this one, think that the 
new immigrants constitute a clear net plus for American 
society. Immigrants are “positively selected” from their 
populations of origin (Feliciano 2005). They pass a difficult test 
by resettling themselves and their families in the United States. 
They often take jobs natives do not want to perform, work hard 
for long hours, contribute a great deal of entrepreneurial 
creativity, and bring valuable cultural capital—qualities that 
their wages or other standards may not reflect immediately. 
While competition from immigrants may put some low-skilled 
natives, often members of minority groups, at a disadvantage 
in the labor market—and indeed highly skilled immigrants 
may compete against highly skilled natives—it seems to me 
that the strong work effort, relatively low labor cost, and varied 
talents of immigrants expand the overall economy and benefit 
most native-born people. Certainly, the official New York City 
position is that immigrants have prevented the city from 
becoming smaller, poorer, and more like Philadelphia (Lobo 
and Salvo 2004, p. xiv). Regardless of how many books scholars 
write on this topic, however, they are not likely to resolve 
anytime soon the question of whether new immigrants are 
good or bad for America.
That may not be the most important question, however. 
Instead, the fates of their children—the new second 
generation—will likely shape how we evaluate the current 
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epoch of immigration. If the children of immigrants continue 
on their parents’ upward path, the judgment is likely to be 
positive. After all, we judge the last great era of immigration, 
the 1880s to the 1920s, to have been a success because 
subsequent generations advanced, on average, beyond the 
previous ones (DiNardo and Estes 2000; Card 2005). As more 
and more descendants of post-1965 immigrants come of age 
today, scholars have begun to focus on what is happening to 
them. In addition to studies of individual outcomes, studies of 
this group, which includes native-born children of immigrants, 
have considered their family and neighborhood contexts 
(Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004). To paraphrase Max 
Frisch, “we asked for workers, but families came.”
The children of immigrants are numerous. The March 
2004 CPS indicates that 10.6 percent of America’s residents 
are native-born individuals with at least one immigrant 
parent (who might, following Rumbaut [2003], be termed 
2.0- or 2.5-generation immigrants). If we subtract the 
1.5-generation youngsters (defined as those who arrived by 
age twelve and then grew up here) from the immigrant total 
and add them to the native children with at least one 
immigrant parent, then adult immigrants over seventeen 
make up about 9.4 percent of the national population, 
while their 1.5-, 2.0-, and 2.5-generation children make up 
12.9 percent. According to the March 2004 CPS, more than 
half the youngsters under eighteen in New York and almost 
two-thirds of those in Los Angeles County have at least one 
immigrant parent. Clearly, the fates of these youngsters are 
vital to the future of such cities.
The decennial census provides a way to take a more detailed 
look at young people growing up in immigrant households 
than is possible from the Current Population Survey. Unlike 
the CPS, the census no longer asks where one’s parents were 
born. But if we look at young people still living in their parents’ 
homes, we can use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Public Use 
Microdata Sample (PUMS) to identify the nativity of parents. 
The 2000 PUMS indicates that 1.62 million biological children, 
adopted children, or stepchildren under the age of eighteen 
lived in families headed by their parent or parents in New York 
City in 2000.1 (As they age past eighteen, children are 
increasingly likely to leave their parents’ households, 
preventing us from knowing from the census the nativity of 
their parents. Almost all of those younger than eighteen, 
however, live in their families of origin, so we can analyze them 
from census data.) About 1 million of these youngsters lived in 
families with a household head and spouse, while 619,000 lived 
in families with a householder, typically the mother, and no 
spouse present. (Such families often did, however, include 
other adults, such as an unmarried partner or a grandparent.)
Table 1 shows that 513,000 (50.8 percent) of those living in 
two-parent families had two immigrant parents, while another 
123,000 (12.2 percent) had one immigrant and one native 
parent. Almost two-thirds of those growing up in two-parent 
households therefore had at least one immigrant parent. 
Among children living in single-parent families, two-fifths had 
a foreign parent. Taking both types of families together, we 
note that children with at least one immigrant parent thus 
made up 54 percent of the young people in New York City 
families in 2000. If something differentially bad is happening to 
them, or even a large subset of them, it would not be good for 
the city’s future.
There is reason to worry about the future of this second 
generation. While New York City can be tough on any young 
person, regardless of where their parents were born, the 
children of immigrants face extra difficulties. First, only a third 
of New York City’s 3 million households are families with 
related children under eighteen. (In other words, two-thirds of 
the households do not face the burdens of rearing children.) 
Within that group of families with children, those headed by 
immigrant parents are much less likely to speak English at 
home (only 19 percent do, as opposed to 60 percent of those 
headed by native parents) and they may not even understand 
English (about a quarter, as opposed to only 4 percent of native 
parents).2 Only half the parents in immigrant families are 
citizens, compared with 100 percent of native parents, giving 
them far less political influence than native parents have.3
Most crucially, immigrant parents are less likely to be well 
educated than native parents: a third lack a high-school degree, 
compared with one-fifth of native parents; while only a fifth 
have college degrees, compared with a quarter of native 
parents. As a consequence, they have less income. Immigrant 
Table 1
Families with Related Children under Age Eighteen 
and Number of Related Children under Age 












NB 2PF 211,472 20.7 373,410 22.9
NB 1PF 259,959 25.4 370,227 22.7
Mixed 2PF 67,743 6.6 122,763 7.5
FB 2PF 299,504 29.3 512,537 31.5
FB 1PF 183,441 17.9 249,047 15.3
Total 1,022,119 100.0 1,627,984 100.0
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 5 Percent Public Use Microdata 
Sample.
Notes: The sample is all New York City households in 2000 with related 
children under age eighteen. NB is native born, FB is foreign born, 2PF 
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parents had a mean household income of $54,404 in 1999, 
compared with $73,983 for native parents. Although white 
immigrants move to New York, only 18 percent of immigrant 
parents classify themselves as non-Hispanic whites, compared 
with 41.5 percent of native parents. Immigrant parents often 
live in neighborhoods surrounded by families with similar 
characteristics, potentially reinforcing their disadvantages. 
While living among fellow immigrants may also convey some 
advantages—for example, through employment opportunities 
available via ethnic networks—it would not seem logical that 
they outweigh the challenges of immigrant life. In short, kids 
growing up in immigrant families have parents with less 
English facility, less education, less political clout, and less 
income than those growing up in native families. It would not 
be surprising if these factors constituted barriers to their 
progress.
Scholars speculating about second-generation trajectories 
have also worried that the larger social patterns of racial 
inequality and discrimination will force those children of 
immigrants who are not classified as white into the ranks of 
persistently poor native minorities. Gans (1992), for example, 
was concerned that being black would trump the aspirations 
for upward mobility of dark-skinned children of immigrants, 
and his hypothesis received support from Waters’ (2001) 
ethnography of Afro-Caribbeans in New York City. Building 
on this concern, Portes and his colleagues developed the 
“segmented assimilation” model of second-generation 
trajectories (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes 1995; Zhou 1997; 
Portes and Rumbaut 2001a, pp. 44-69, 280-6; 2001b, 
pp. 303-12). 
While the nuances and subtleties of this formulation allow 
for a wide variety of individual outcomes, its core idea is that 
whether they like it or not, groups of immigrants are forced 
to face the fundamental American condition of racial 
stratification and discrimination. Depending on immigrants’ 
national origins, group socioeconomic characteristics, and the 
particular conditions of the places where they end up settling, 
the segmented assimilation model posits three general 
trajectories that groups might follow. A positive reception from 
the white middle-class majority would enable light-skinned 
immigrants from relatively high-income countries to 
assimilate relatively easily into the mainstream. Racial 
inequality, however, would force dark-skinned immigrants 
from poorer countries to assimilate downwardly into a native 
minority lower class. Groups that cannot easily be classified 
into white and black categories, however, might try to retain 
their cultural distinctiveness in service of economic 
achievement, especially when a group has developed a strong 
ethnic economy.
While this model has been subject to theoretical and 
substantive criticism (Waldinger and Feliciano 2004; Alba and 
Nee 2003), the notion that the dynamics of racial inequality in 
host societies will force major parts of the second generation 
toward downward mobility and socioeconomic exclusion has 
motivated a growing and intense debate in the United States 
and Europe. While Europe lacks an exact analog to African-
Americans as an historically subordinated domestic racial 
group in the United States, many European nations must 
contend with difficult colonial legacies (European Commission 
2003). In both places, some second-generation immigrant 
groups occupy particularly problematic positions. Most first-
generation immigrants who entered bad situations in the 
receiving countries ultimately had higher earnings or income 
over time than they would have had in their old countries 
(otherwise, they would have gone home). In the United States, 
a striking number moved well beyond their low starting points. 
As a result, some degree of upward mobility seems practically 
built into the first-generation immigrant experience, even if 
earnings remain low compared with those of natives. We can 
make no such assumption about the second generation. In fact, 
first-generation achievements may soften the second-
generation desire for mobility, even as the new second 
generation remains less well positioned than its native peers to 
make the transition to adulthood (Mollenkopf et al. 2004).
What, then, do the data tell us about how the passage of the 
children of immigrants through adolescence to young 
adulthood compares with that of the children of native parents 
in New York City? How do the characteristics of the parents, or 
the choices they and their children make, or the experiences 
they accumulate, shape such important outcomes as 
educational attainment, entry into the labor market, and family 
formation? Does the impact on children in immigrant families 
differ from the impact on youngsters with native-born parents? 
And how do racial differences affect the answers to these 
questions?
Until now, researchers have had only limited data to explore 
the trajectories of the second generation. Although the CPS in 
1994 began to ask about a parent’s place of birth, this relatively 
small random sample of the national population is designed to 
gather labor market information on adults, not detailed 
demographic and life-course information on specific immigrant 
groups in specific locales. (The CPS sample included 2,564 
individuals in New York City in 2004.) One can combine CPS 
samples from different years, but this does not overcome limits 
on the kinds of questions the CPS asks or on the structure of its 
sample. The PUMS sample is not subject to this problem 
because it is 100 times larger than the CPS sample, but it does 
not identify parents’ nativity once a youngster moves out of the 108 Trajectories for the Immigrant Second Generation
family of origin. The PUMS also reports only the answers to the 
twenty-nine questions on the census long form.
To address these data shortcomings, the Russell Sage 
Foundation initiated a research project that enabled the author 
and his colleagues to gather data on representative samples of 
young adults aged eighteen to thirty-two from five immigrant 
group backgrounds (Dominican, Colombian/Ecuadoran/
Peruvian, Anglophone Afro-Caribbean, Chinese, and Russian) 
and three native-born racial and ethnic groups (white, African-
American, and Puerto Rican) living in metropolitan New York. 
The project is the Immigrant Second Generation in 
Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) study.4 This paper uses the 
2000 PUMS data on youngsters under eighteen in New York 
City to paint a broad, descriptive picture of the earlier years and 
uses the ISGMNY data to examine the details for specific 
groups as they enter adulthood.
2.T h e  P a r e n t a l  C o n t e x t
We have noted that immigrant parents tend to have less 
English language ability, education, and income than native-
born parents. When comparing the two groups, however, it is 
useful to distinguish both their racial and ethnic backgrounds 
and family forms so we can analyze similar groups. Table 2 
shows the distribution of families by nativity, race, and form.5 
Three patterns emerge. First, the different racial groups tend to 
have strikingly different family forms. Overall, 57 percent of all 
families with children under eighteen have a household head 
and spouse; however, this is true of more than four-fifths of 
white and Asian households, less than half of Hispanic 
households, and only a third of black households. Second, 
within these broad racial groups, the native families are more 
likely to be single-parent families than are the immigrant 
families. Finally, these broad racial categories have different 
mixes of native and immigrant families. Black and Hispanic 
families are roughly evenly split between native and immigrant 
parents, but white households are predominantly native and 
Asian households are predominantly immigrant. These 
patterns have a number of implications.
How does controlling for a family’s race affect the previously 
noted differences in English-language use, education, and 
income between native and immigrant parents? It turns out 
that the native-immigrant parental language gap is greatest 
among whites and large among Asians, but far less wide among 
blacks and Hispanics. This is because most black immigrants 
come from English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, so 
most speak English at home—just like the native born do. 
Similarly, most Hispanic immigrant families speak Spanish at 
home, but so do almost all native Hispanic families. To the 
extent that differences in household language from the native 
racial and ethnic comparison group impede the transition to 
adulthood, the differences should have the greatest impact on 
whites and Asians, less of an impact on blacks (although it is 
still an issue for Haitians), and the smallest impact on Hispanic 
immigrant families.
Controls for race and family form also attenuate the 
educational gap between immigrant parents and their native 
counterparts. Table 3 shows parental levels of education across 
native and immigrant families, controlling for race and family 
form. In general, all three factors—race, nativity, and family 
form—seem to have a stronger relationship to educational 
outcomes. In general, the rates of college education are much 
greater for white (42 percent) and Asian (35 percent) family 
heads than for black (14 percent) and Hispanic (8 percent) 
family heads. (White two-parent families are also much more 
likely to have a college-educated spouse.) Within each of these 
racial groups, heads of two-parent families are always more 
likely to have college educations than are heads of one-parent 
families.
After controlling for race and family form, however, we note 
that the pattern between native and immigrant family heads 
and spouses is less clear. For whites and Asians, the native-born 
parents are substantially more likely to be college educated 
than are the immigrant parents in both one- and two-parent 
families; this is also true, to a narrower extent, for Hispanic 
families. Blacks, however, constitute an exception: the 
Table 2
Families by Type and Race of Family Head 
Percentage of Households with Related Children 
under Age Eighteen








NB 2PF 4.4 3.8 0.2 11.9 20.7
NB 1PF 8.6 12.6 0.1 3.6 25.4
Mixed 2PF 2.1 1.1 0.4 2.8 6.6
FB 2PF 8.9 5.1 7.9 5.6 29.3
FB 1PF 8.4 6.0 1.4 1.3 17.9
Total 32.4 28.6 9.9 25.2 100.0
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 5 Percent Public Use Microdata 
Sample.
Notes: The sample is all New York City households in 2000 with related 
children under age eighteen. NB is native born, FB is foreign born, 2PF 
is two-parent family, 1PF is single-parent family, NH is non-Hispanic. 
The family head may be either sex. Native American and NH other-race 
households (3.8 percent of total) are not reported.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2005 109
immigrant parents are more likely to be college educated than 
are the native parents. Note that although the racial groups 
differ greatly in terms of parental levels of education, and 
whites and Asians have higher levels than blacks and Hispanics, 
blacks are not the group with the lowest levels.
These controls also shed light on the overall patterns of 
employment, workers in the family, and household income 
(Table 4). Once more, racial differences are strong, with white 
and Asian parents having substantially higher rates of 
employment than black and especially Hispanic parents. As 
might be deduced from the high levels of education among 
Table 4
Employment of Family Head and Spouse and Median 
Household Income by Race of Family Head and 
Family Form























Hispanic NB 2PF 65 50 2.62 $47,000
 NB  1PF 42 — 1.82 $16,100
 Mixed  2PF 68 53 2.68 $43,000
 FB  2PF 61 41 2.78 $36,900
 FB  1PF 48   — 2.16 $20,900
 Total 54 45 2.33 $28,400
NH black NB 2PF 65 62 2.72 $54,000
 NB  1PF 50   — 1.90 $21,100
 Mixed  2PF 75 66 2.81 $56,000
 FB  2PF 75 64 2.88 $55,000
 FB  1PF 66   — 2.25 $30,000
 Total 61 63 2.29 $33,000
NH Asian NB 2PF 74 63 2.60 $64,000
 NB  1PF 58   — 2.20 $30,500
 Mixed  2PF 81 59 2.84 $67,000
 FB  2PF 77 49 2.73 $40,750
 FB  1PF 67 — 2.37 $33,900
 Total 75 50 2.68 $40,900
NH white NB 2PF 85 60 2.71 $83,100
 NB  1PF 67 — 2.05 $42,000
 Mixed  2PF 82 57 2.66 $71,000
 FB  2PF 76 48 2.61 $49,000
 FB  1PF 61 — 2.07 $27,300
 Total 79 56 2.55 $64,300
Total NB 2PF 77 58 2.69 $66,600
  NB 1PF 50  — 1.90 $21,610
  Mixed 2PF 76 58 2.70 $57,220
  FB 2PF 71 49 2.74 $43,000
  FB 1PF 57 — 2.20 $26,000
  Total 65 53 2.42 $38,000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 5 Percent Public Use Microdata Sample.
Notes: The sample is all New York City households in 2000 with related 
children under age eighteen. NB is native born, FB is foreign born, 2PF 
is two-parent family, 1PF is single-parent family, NH is non-Hispanic. 
The family head may be either sex. Native American and NH other-race 
households (3.8 percent of total) are not reported.
Table 3
Education of Family Head and Spouse by Race 
of Family Head and by Family Form and Nativity 
























H i s p a n i c N B  2 P F 3 11 03 21 1
 NB  1PF 43 06 —   —
 M i x e d   2 P F 2 91 33 21 5
 F B   2 P F 5 00 95 10 8
 FB  1PF 50 07 — —
 T o t a l 4 40 84 31 0
N H  b l a c k N B  2 P F 2 21 62 21 5
 NB  1PF 28 10 —   —
 M i x e d   2 P F 1 42 61 52 4
 F B   2 P F 2 62 02 81 6
 FB  1PF 28 14 —   —
 T o t a l 2 61 42 41 7
N H  A s i a n N B  2 P F 0 75 30 74 8
 NB  1PF 18 22 — —
 M i x e d   2 P F 1 45 51 84 6
 F B   2 P F 2 93 53 42 8
  FB 1PF 31 30  — —
 T o t a l 2 83 53 32 9
N H  w h i t e N B  2 P F 0 74 70 74 5
 NB  1PF 14 32 — —
 M i x e d   2 P F 1 34 40 94 1
 F B   2 P F 1 83 71 93 4
  FB 1PF 19 36  —  —
 T o t a l 1 24 21 14 1
T o t a l N B  2 P F 1 53 31 53 2
 NB  1PF 31 12 —   —
 M i x e d   2 P F 1 83 11 82 9
 F B   2 P F 3 32 43 52 0
  FB 1PF 38 14  —  —
 T o t a l 2 92 12 62 5
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 5 Percent Public Use Microdata 
Sample.
Notes: The sample is all New York City households in 2000 with related 
children under age eighteen. NB is native born, FB is foreign born, 2PF 
is two-parent family, 1PF is single-parent family, NH is non-Hispanic. 
The family head may be either sex. Native American and NH other-race 
households (3.8 percent of total) are not reported.110 Trajectories for the Immigrant Second Generation
white parents, their income levels are even higher than their 
employment rates compared with other groups. Family form 
also has a strong effect on employment rates and income, with 
two-parent families by definition being much more likely to 
have an employed spouse, more workers in the family, and 
higher incomes than single-parent families.
Finally, nativity counts too, but not in a consistent way. 
Among Hispanics and whites, immigrant parents are 
somewhat less likely to work than their native-born 
counterparts; among blacks and Asians, however, they are 
more likely to be working. Immigrant single parents are also 
more likely to work than their native-born counterparts in 
every group but whites. (This is probably related to the fact that 
the black and Hispanic native-born single parents are 
substantially more likely to have had public assistance income.) 
Finally, the fact that immigrant families consistently have a 
higher mean number of workers than their native-born 
counterparts is also significant. This combined work effort 
helps to bring the median household incomes of the immigrant 
families closer to, and in some cases actually above, those of 
their native counterparts, despite their parental gaps in 
education and English-language proficiency. In particular, it is 
noteworthy that the median household income of the 
immigrant black, Hispanic, and Asian single-parent families 
exceeds that of their native counterparts, given the relative 
prevalence of this family form among blacks and Hispanics.
Beyond the ways in which two-parent families have obvious 
material advantages over single-parent families, work conveys 
moral authority in our society, and the mainstream often takes 
income as a measure of social achievement. Immigrant 
household incomes compare well with those of their native 
counterparts, given the disadvantages they face. Note also that 
white and Asian immigrant household incomes lag those of 
their native counterparts, partly because native whites are the 
best-positioned group and native Asians are relatively few. The 
incomes of Hispanic immigrants lag those of their native 
counterparts the least, partly because both groups are having 
the hardest time. Remarkably, black immigrant household 
incomes are doing the best compared with incomes of their 
native counterparts, despite the fact that this group is 
theoretically most at risk of downward assimilation.
The ISGMNY gives more detail on the family backgrounds 
of immigrant second-generation and native young adults aged 
eighteen to thirty-two who grew up in New York City and still 
live there. Some of the major dimensions are given in Table 5. 
As hinted at in the PUMS data, the type of family situation in 
which young people grow up and enter adulthood is an 
important factor differentiating blacks and Hispanics from 
whites and Asians, and to a lesser degree native parents from 
immigrant parents. Table 5 shows how fragile family life has 
been for many young New Yorkers, especially members of 
native minority groups. More than half of African-Americans 
and large minorities of West Indians, Puerto Ricans, and 
Dominicans grew up without ever knowing a parent, usually 
the father. Even a third of the native white children grew up 
without one biological parent. Of those who did grow up with 
two parents, in many cases those parents had split up by the 
time the child reached young adulthood, so that significantly 
Table 5
Family Background: Children of Immigrants and Native Born
Percent
Group




















CEP 68.1 51.2 16.6 1.98 26.8 18.1 33.2 12.3
DR 58.9 40.1 14.2 2.35 44.4 15.5 48.8 7.1
PR 55.0 34.9 12.2 2.16 41.0 10.0 37.9 11.8
WI 52.4 32.0 20.4 2.23 14.7 24.4 10.3 25.6
NB 43.0 21.0 9.8 2.69 22.2 17.1 16.1 19.8
CHI 88.9 79.8 25.7 1.55 38.1 19.3 42.9 14.8
RJ 82.0 73.0 28.8 1.00 5.4 58.7 4.6 68.2
NW 68.5 47.5 11.7 1.65 11.2 35.8 11.7 39.2
Source: Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York study.
Notes: The sample is people aged eighteen to thirty-two who grew up and still live in New York City. CEP is parents are from Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru, 
DR is parents are from the Dominican Republic, PR is parents are native Puerto Rican, WI is parents are from Anglophone West Indies, NB is parents are 
native black, CHI is parents are Chinese born abroad, RJ is parents are Jews from former Soviet Union, NW is parents are native white.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2005 111
fewer than half have an intact family of origin for many of the 
groups we studied. Among our native black respondents, only 
one in five has such a situation. (In every comparison, the 
situation is more dire for the native groups.) Conversely, the 
immigrant groups often had additional adult figures beyond 
their parents in their household, such as a grandmother or 
uncle. Meanwhile, the groups that had relatively few parent 
figures to care for them also had larger mean numbers of 
siblings, with the native black families being the largest. This 
points toward what might be called differing “family strategies 
of intergenerational mobility” across the groups being 
analyzed—with some groups having significantly higher ratios 
of adults caring for children and working to receive income 
relative to the number of children to be cared for.
Finally, Table 5 makes it clear that most of the minority and 
immigrant young people we interviewed have parents with 
relatively low levels of education; even the native whites who 
grew up in New York City did not come from particularly well-
educated families. Only the Russian parents stand out as highly 
educated. (If we include native whites who grew up outside 
New York, educational attainment for white parents would be 
substantially higher.) Within this overall pattern of relatively 
low rates of parental education, several striking differences 
emerge across the groups. The Dominican and Puerto Rican 
parents are the least educated, followed by the Chinese, the 
black groups and the South Americans are in the middle, and 
the West Indian parents are the best educated, while the two 
white groups have the highest levels of education. In each case, 
the immigrant parents are somewhat better educated than their 
native counterparts, with the Russian Jewish parents enjoying a 
particular advantage over the parents of native white New 
Yorkers. To the extent that parental education is a dominant 
factor in explaining children’s educational attainment, and 
therefore their lifetime earnings, we might expect the outcomes 
for the children to follow the same general pattern (Sewell et al. 
2001, pp. 20, 27).
3. Second-Generation Outcomes
The census PUMS data provide only very limited information 
for assessing the educational outcomes of the new second 
generation—whether school-age children are enrolled in 
grades appropriate for their age and whether they have 
completed those grades in a timely manner. (PUMS also tells us 
whether enrollment is in a public or private institution.) 
However limited this measure is, it is still an important 
yardstick. Since PUMS provides the most complete coverage, 
we begin with this source. To explore enrollment in an age-
appropriate grade, we calculate measures to determine whether 
a child was enrolled in fifth grade or higher by age twelve or was 
enrolled in ninth grade by age sixteen. (Since children typically 
enter the first grade at age six, they have definitely fallen behind 
if they are not enrolled in the fifth grade six years later or in the 
ninth grade ten years later.) Table 6 presents the results for 
young New Yorkers categorized by their family’s nativity and 
form and the race of the head of the household.
Looking first at the 526,000 youngsters aged twelve to 
seventeen, we note that about 2.5 percent overall have failed to 
Table 6
Enrollment in Appropriate Grade and Private High 
School, Related Children under Age Eighteen 






















Hispanic NB 2PF 3.8 6.2 19.6
 NB  1PF 3.3 8.0 10.3
 Mixed  2PF 2.1 3.1 12.3
 FB  2PF 2.6 7.7 12.4
 FB  1PF 2.9 6.6 7.7
 Total 3.0 7.0 11.7
NH black NB 2PF 2.6 6.4 13.4
 NB  1PF 2.8 7.5 7.8
 Mixed  2PF 2.4 6.4 14.0
 FB  2PF 2.3 5.7 13.3
 FB  1PF 1.4 4.7 10.4
 Total 2.4 6.3 10.6
NH Asian NB 2PF 1.4 4.4 10.9
 NB  1PF 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Mixed  2PF 7.1 13.9 8.2
 FB  2PF 2.5 4.8 8.2
 FB  1PF 1.4 4.3 5.8
 Total 2.5 4.8 7.9
NH white NB 2PF 1.7 3.6 54.0
 NB  1PF 1.9 4.0 35.3
 Mixed  2PF 1.1 3.7 61.7
 FB  2PF 1.5 4.2 31.4
 FB  1PF 4.0 10.7 31.8
 Total 1.7 4.2 45.7
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 5 Percent Public Use Microdata 
Sample.
Notes: NB is native born, FB is foreign born, 2PF is two-parent family, 
1PF is single-parent family, NH is non-Hispanic. The family head may be 
either sex. Native American and NH other-race households (3.8 percent 
of total) are not reported.112 Trajectories for the Immigrant Second Generation
enroll in the fifth grade. Table 6 suggests that this trend does 
not vary greatly across racial groups, although whites are doing 
best and Hispanics worst, with blacks and Asians in between 
and blacks actually doing better than Asians. For Hispanics and 
blacks, the children in immigrant households are doing better 
than those in the comparable native-born households, but the 
opposite is true in white and Asian families. Family form does 
not seem to have a consistent or marked impact, which may be 
good news. Table 6 shows similar patterns for the 170,000 
youngsters aged sixteen or seventeen. Whites continue to be 
the least likely not to have achieved the appropriate grade for 
their age, while Hispanic children are the most likely to be 
lagging. Blacks have now moved in front of Asians to be the 
second most likely group to be lagging. Children in native-born 
single-parent families are now more at risk than those in two-
parent families across all racial groups, but unexpectedly, 
children in immigrant single-parent families are less likely to be 
behind than children in native-born single-parent families, 
except for white immigrant single-parent families, which seem 
to be having large and increasing difficulties over time 
compared with the other racial groups. As before, the largest 
consistent differences seem driven by race. Family form and 
nativity count, but not as expected. Strikingly, the children in 
Hispanic and black immigrant single-parent families are less 
likely to be lagging their native counterparts, but children in 
Hispanic and black immigrant two-parent families are more 
likely to be lagging. 
The racial differences in age-appropriate grade enrollment 
are accentuated by the fact that white families are more than 
four times as likely to send their children to private high 
schools compared with the other racial groups. Hispanic and 
black native two-parent families are also more likely than other 
groups to send their youngsters to private high schools; single-
parent families, with less means, are less likely to do so. 
Ironically, the group that shows the highest levels of 
educational attainment in relation to their parents’ low levels of 
education—the children growing up in Asian immigrant 
families—are the most likely to stick with the public high 
schools. As the work of the ISGMNY has shown, the Asian 
second generation is the most able to navigate the New York 
City public school system to find the best schools, while the 
black and Hispanic groups are the least able (Mollenkopf et al. 
2001). Since the age limit of seventeen for the PUMS data 
prevents us from computing high-school graduation rates, the 
ISGMNY data, presented in Table 7 in a form comparable to 
that of the prior PUMS data, confirm these patterns.
Table 7 shows the strong differences in outcomes according 
to the race, family form growing up, and nativity of the families 
of our respondents. The two native minority groups, African-
Americans and particularly Puerto Ricans, are most likely to 
lack a high-school diploma and least likely to have a B.A. (or to 
be seeking one). Failure to obtain a high-school degree ranges 
23 percentage points, from a low of 7.6 percent among Russian 
Jews to a high of 30.4 percent among Puerto Ricans. (The 
spread on college achievement is greater, 50 percentage points, 
from 21 percent among African-Americans to 71.5 percent 
among Russians.) The spread across family types is smaller, but 
still marked, generally on the order of 5 to 7 percentage points, 
depending on the group. As the last column of Table 7 suggests, 
Table 7




















CEP Yes 14.4 45.5 40.1 13.8
No 16.3 48.1 35.6 23.1
 Total 15.0 46.3 38.7 16.5
DR Yes 19.4 47.1 33.5 23.8
 No 23.9 50.3 25.8 24.8
 Total 21.2 48.4 30.3 24.0
PR Yes 23.0 48.5 28.4 25.7
 No 39.3 44.6 16.1 31.9
 Total 30.4 46.8 22.8 28.4
WI Yes 15.8 50.0 34.2 16.4
 No 20.9 49.4 29.7 23.9
 Total 18.2 49.7 32.0 19.6
NB Yes 19.9 56.7 23.4 22.5
 No 26.6 54.3 19.1 31.4
 Total 23.7 55.3 21.0 27.8
CHI Yes 8.1 22.3 69.6 8.3
 No 15.5 25.9 58.6 20.0
 Total 8.9 22.7 68.4 10.0
RJ Yes 7.5 18.5 74.0 10.7
 No 8.0 32.0 60.0 14.3
 Total 7.6 20.9 71.5 11.4
NW Yes 16.1 33.9 50.0 6.4
 No 13.7 45.1 41.2 3.8
 Total 15.3 37.4 47.2 5.8
Source: Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York study.
Notes: The sample is people aged eighteen to thirty-two who grew up 
and still live in New York City. CEP is parents are from Colombia, 
Ecuador, or Peru, DR is parents are from the Dominican Republic, PR 
is parents are native Puerto Rican, WI is parents are from Anglophone 
West Indies, NB is parents are native black, CHI is parents are Chinese 
born abroad, RJ is parents are Jews from former Soviet Union, NW is 
parents are native white.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2005 113
the men in each group are doing less well than the women in 
both types of families. In particular, except for native whites, 
males growing up in families headed by their mothers seem 
particularly vulnerable—the rate at which they fail to get a 
high-school diploma ranges from only 3.8 percent among 
native whites to almost 33 percent among Puerto Ricans and 
African-Americans. This result is worthy of a paper all its own; 
suffice it to say that young men are more exposed to the 
vicissitudes of the street and negative encounters with 
authority while also being surrounded by a peer culture that 
values toughness and boldness, while young women receive 
more encouragement for academic achievement and are more 
sheltered from the street by their families. (These patterns hold 
even when looking at all respondents who grew up in the 
metropolitan area, so they are not simply the product of the 
out-migration of the more successful members of less 
successful groups.)
Much about these outcomes jibes with the standard status 
attainment model. Young adults from groups characterized by 
two-parent families, better educated parents, parents with jobs, 
and fewer siblings did the best. Those who grew up in the 
opposite contexts generally had the hardest time getting an 
education. Still, multivariate analysis that regresses educational 
outcomes on family and parental characteristics shows that 
significant group differences remain even after applying these 
family controls (for elaboration on this point, see Kasinitz et al. 
[forthcoming]). As one can sense from Table 7, the Chinese are 
doing extraordinarily well given their modest family origins—
indeed, they are far outperforming what family backgrounds 
alone would predict—while Puerto Ricans and African-
Americans are achieving significantly less education than 
family background alone would predict. That the second-
generation youngsters are getting consistently although not 
hugely more education than their native counterparts even 
after controlling for family background says as much about 
how bad things are for native minorities as it does for how well 
the children of immigrants are doing. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that after family background is controlled for, the 
educational attainment of second-generation South 
Americans, Dominicans, and West Indians is not statistically 
significantly different from that of New York–bred native 
whites. (Of course, because these second-generation groups 
have different family backgrounds than do whites, they are not 
getting as much education as whites in absolute terms.)
One important fork in the road faced by young New Yorkers 
is where to go to high school. While the literature on 
educational attainment has found that school characteristics 
do not have much effect on educational attainment net of 
family background, that seems not to be the case in New York 
City. Some high schools had high graduation and college 
attendance rates, while our respondents told us that others 
lacked discipline or had teachers who they felt disrespected 
their students. These characteristics were clearly associated 
with post-secondary enrollment net of family characteristics 
(Mollenkopf et al. 2001). Faced with bad public schools, many 
families sought private alternatives for their children, mostly 
parochial schools (or Jewish yeshivas in the case of Russian 
youngsters).
Table 7 shows that native whites were most likely to exit the 
public school system, followed by Russians and South 
Americans. The pattern across family types shows that, except 
for Chinese and Russians, where there were no differences, the 
two-parent families were consistently more likely to send their 
children to private high schools, largely because their incomes 
were higher and more could afford to do so. Interestingly, two 
groups with quite different educational attainment profiles, 
native blacks and Chinese, were the most likely to attend public 
high schools, followed by native blacks, West Indians, 
Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans. One reason why the Chinese, 
unlike the other second-generation groups, were highly likely 
to stay in the public schools is that they tended to live in less 
segregated neighborhoods near whites that had better primary 
schools that fed into better high schools. Whites, Russians, and 
Chinese were least likely to go to public high schools in the 
bottom quintile of school performance rankings. Indeed, 
almost one-fifth of Chinese went to one of New York City’s 
famed selective high schools, such as Brooklyn Tech or 
Townsend Harris in Queens, as did one out of ten Russians. 
Meanwhile, a third of those from the poorer Hispanic 
groups—Dominicans and Puerto Ricans—went to badly 
performing public high schools, as did a quarter of native 
blacks and a fifth of West Indians. These high schools drew 
from the poorest neighborhoods of the city, had 
overwhelmingly minority student bodies, and often had many 
students from Spanish-speaking families. The table shows that 
many two-parent families, even from these relatively low 
income groups, sacrificed to take their children out of the 
public system.
These different kinds of high schools tracked directly into 
the disparate experiences with post-secondary education 
already outlined above. Using the U.S. News and World Report 
ranking system, with National I being the highest rating and 
Regional IV the lowest rating, Table 8 shows the percentage of 
those attending college whose institution falls into the lowest 
category. While the pattern overall is similar to that for high-
school quality, several departures stand out. West Indians, who 
had been less likely than African-Americans to attend the 
lowest performing high schools, were about as likely to attend 
the lowest ranked colleges and universities. In addition, the 
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substantially outperformed all the others in attaining a B.A. 
and in performance, followed by Dominicans, native whites, 
West Indians, and South Americans—all bunched around one 
in five. Puerto Ricans and native blacks achieved only half that 
rate. For every group, children growing up in two-parent 
families were more likely to have gotten their degrees.
Outcomes other than education are also of considerable 
interest, particularly labor force status and the balance between 
working and parenting. These are summarized in Table 9. The 
majority of every group of our respondents found a job by age 
twenty-three, in most cases the great majority. South 
Americans, Chinese, Russians, and West Indians all had 
employment rates that exceeded that of whites. Once again, 
however, the two native-born minority groups, African-
Americans and Puerto Ricans, were least likely to be working. 
Reciprocally, a third of African-American and a quarter of 
Puerto Rican young adults were neither at work nor attending 
school. (Subtracting the first two columns of data in Table 9 
from 100 yields the percentage of those in each group who are 
attending school but not working.) Growing up in a one- or 
two-parent family did not seem to have a great direct effect on 
participation in the labor force, although those from two-
parent families were consistently somewhat more likely to have 
a job. Only among Chinese, Russians, and whites, where 
growing up in a single-parent family was comparatively rare, 
did this seem to have a big effect on people neither having a job 
nor going to school at age twenty-three or older. Having an 
arrest record probably was related to labor market status: the 
males among our respondents were twice as likely as the 
females to have been arrested. Table 9 shows that a good many 
males in every group except Chinese and Russians were likely 
to have gotten into trouble with the police, rising to one-third 
among African-Americans. Except for Dominicans, males 
growing up in single-parent families were more likely, and in 
some cases substantially more likely, to have been arrested. 
Needless to say, this can have a deleterious effect on one’s job 
prospects, although the damage is likely greater for minority 
young people than for whites (Pager 2003).
Similarly, most of our respondents remain unmarried and 
are not cohabiting with a partner. Only among Dominicans are 
a majority married or cohabiting. Chinese are far and away the 
least likely to be forming relationships, just as they are among 
the more likely to be working or going to school. Interestingly, 
those who grew up in two-parent families are consistently less 
likely to have formed a serious relationship, while those who 
grew up in single-parent families are more likely to have exited 
their parent’s household and formed a new relationship of their 
own. More troubling are the continuing patterns of forming 
single-parent households among African-Americans and 
Puerto Ricans and to a lesser extent West Indians and 
the low-performing public high schools, also often found itself 
in the lowest ranked post-secondary institutions. Meanwhile, 
the Chinese almost entirely escaped them and were among the 
most prevalent of any group in higher ranked institutions. The 
last column of Table 8 looks only at those young people who 
grew up and still live in New York who are aged twenty-five to 
thirty-two and who have had more time to complete a college 
degree. Two second-generation groups, Chinese and Russians, 
Table 8
Type of High School and College Attended 























CEP Yes 80.5 12.1 10.0 24.5
No 89.2 10.0 25.0 21.9
  Total 83.2 11.4 15.6 23.8
DR Yes 84.6 29.7 25.0 26.1
  No 92.3 36.4 46.7 20.8
  Total 87.7 32.4 35.5 24.1
PR Yes 82.0 33.3 29.4 14.1
  No 92.2 39.8 40.0 11.3
  Total 86.6 36.5 35.1 12.9
WI Yes 85.6 14.4 38.9 27.6
  No 94.7 24.6 44.4 13.6
  Total 89.9 19.4 41.7 21.5
NB Yes 92.8 22.3 44.4 14.3
  No 94.1 25.5 45.5 9.0
  Total 93.5 24.2 45.1 11.3
CHI Yes 95.3 7.6 3.1 60.0
  No 91.2 7.3 0.0 18.2
  Total 94.9 7.6 2.9 56.7
RJ Yes 82.6 0.0 42.9 45.3
  No 82.0 0.0 33.3 22.2
  Total 82.5 0.0 40.0 39.4
NW Yes 58.3 12.0 0.0 22.6
  No 62.0 4.0 14.3 19.0
  Total 59.5 9.3 7.7 21.7
Source: Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York study.
Notes: The sample is people aged eighteen to thirty-two who grew up 
and still live in New York City. CEP is parents are from Colombia, 
Ecuador, or Peru, DR is parents are from the Dominican Republic, PR 
is parents are native Puerto Rican, WI is parents are from Anglophone 
West Indies, NB is parents are native black, CHI is parents are Chinese 
born abroad, RJ is parents are Jews from former Soviet Union, NW is 
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Dominicans, many of whom grew up in such households. 
Table 9 shows that about twice as many African-American 
women—two out of five—have had children but are neither 
cohabiting nor married. This is also true for about one out of 
five Puerto Rican and West Indian women.
Given the high level of risk among the native minority 
groups—African-Americans and Puerto Ricans, followed at 
some distance by West Indians and Dominicans—it is perhaps 
not surprising that these groups have lower rates of labor force 
participation and educational attainment and the lowest mean 
household incomes. Across the board, those who grew up (and 
often still live in) singe-parent families have lower mean 
household incomes. By contrast, Chinese and Russians are 
more likely to grow up in two-parent families and attend better 
schools; the men are less likely to face arrest and the women are 
much less likely to have had children on their own. (Chinese, in 
particular, are also highly unlikely even to get married in their 
twenties.) They have the highest mean family incomes, indeed 
higher than that of native whites who grew up and still live in 
New York City.
Table 9



































CEP Yes 79.6 13.9 15.5 58.4 7.8 $46,200
No 85.2 13.0 28.0 51.9 3.8 $28,600
  Total 81.2 13.6 19.3 56.5 5.8 $40,400
DR Yes 78.6 15.9 21.3 43.7 9.1 $34,900
  No 71.0 26.0 19.7 31.9 16.0 $21,400
  Total 75.9 19.5 20.6 39.5 12.2 $29,400
PR Yes 70.9 26.0 24.1 56.7 17.7 $33,300
  No 69.0 28.7 27.7 40.2 25.5 $24,600
  Total 70.1 27.1 25.7 50.0 21.2 $29,400
WI Yes 81.0 13.0 21.4 60.0 18.5 $50,900
  No 78.3 12.0 30.4 54.2 19.0 $30,700
  Total 79.8 12.6 25.1 57.4 18.8 $41,600
NB Yes 63.1 31.7 25.9 62.1 45.3 $27,700
  No 63.8 33.9 41.9 52.8 36.3 $24,800
  Total 63.5 33.4 35.2 57.0 40.2 $26,100
CHI Yes 81.1 12.0 6.7 80.8 0.9 $43,300
  No 70.0 20.0 25.0 61.9  0.0 $29,200
  Total 80.1 12.6 9.0 79.0 0.8 $41,700
RJ Yes 84.3 7.2 10.5 53.0 1.8 $50,100
  No 75.0 21.4 15.4 40.7  0.0 $54,500
  Total 82.0 10.8 11.4 50.0 1.4 $57,900
NW Yes 81.1 14.9 14.0 53.4 6.0 $42,300
  No 68.0 20.0 40.0 58.3 8.3 $29,000
  Total 77.8 16.2 20.7 54.6 6.7 $37,700
Source: Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York study.
Notes: The sample is people aged eighteen to thirty-two who grew up and still live in New York City. CEP is parents are from Colombia, Ecuador, or Peru, 
DR is parents are from the Dominican Republic, PR is parents are native Puerto Rican, WI is parents are from Anglophone West Indies, NB is parents are 
native black, CHI is parents are Chinese born abroad, RJ is parents are Jews from former Soviet Union, NW is parents are native white. 116 Trajectories for the Immigrant Second Generation
4. Conclusion: How Race, Nativity, 
Family Form, and Gender Affect 
Young People in New York City
Massey (2005) correctly observes that the “segmented 
assimilation” model should not be portrayed as holding that 
race by itself will trump ethnicity, family background, gender, 
and other factors in determining the trajectories of the second 
generation. Indeed, its central insight is just the reverse—
that under the right circumstances, ethnicity and family 
background can allay the impact of racial discrimination. At 
the same time, the work of Portes and Rumbaut consistently 
presents African-Americans as the archetypical group for 
whom family and ethnic resources have failed to save them 
from being pushed to the bottom. The data presented here do 
not support that argument in several respects. First, Table 4 
points out that neither African-American nor Afro-Caribbean 
households have the lowest mean household incomes in New 
York City—instead, native Hispanic households, largely 
Puerto Rican, occupy that position—and they do not generally 
classify themselves as black. (Most native Hispanic heads of 
households with children in New York City chose “other race” 
or “white” in the 2000 census; only about 10.8 percent gave 
their race as “black.”) Similarly, members of Dominican 
immigrant households also suffer more on many measures 
than do African-American households, and they too generally 
do not say they are black (12.8 percent gave “black” as one of 
their races). Clearly, the fact that African-Americans and West 
Indians speak English at home, while Puerto Ricans and 
Dominicans generally speak Spanish at home, gives them one 
advantage over Hispanics. In any case, these data suggest that, 
however strong the force of racial discrimination may be in 
New York, black families appear more capable of negotiating it 
than Hispanic families.
Portes and Rumbaut’s formulation emphasizes that the 
selectivity of immigration, the human and social capital of 
immigrant families and communities, and the varying context 
of reception will affect group trajectories (2001a, pp. 44-69). 
Yet they note that the first barrier facing the children of 
nonwhite immigrants is “the persistent practice of 
discrimination based on [physical differences], especially 
against black persons” (pp. 55-6). The authors posit that this 
interacts with two other closely related factors—the hourglass 
central-city economy wrought by deindustrialization and 
suburbanization, and the “emergence of an adversarial outlook 
and deviant lifestyles in American inner cities”—to keep 
“second- and third-generation offspring of ‘colored’ minorities 
bottled up in the inner city while simultaneously preventing 
them from taking advantage of emerging opportunities in the 
new postindustrial economy” (pp. 58-9). The result, in their 
view, is the “‘hyperghetto’—veritable human warehouses 
where the disappearance of work and the everyday reality of 
marginalization led directly to a web of social pathologies” 
(pp. 59-60). 
From this description, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that 
because African-Americans often live in poor neighborhoods 
plagued by joblessness, broken families, and adversarial 
attitudes and behaviors, they constitute a negative example that 
the children of immigrants should avoid, if at all possible. In 
Portes and Rumbaut’s analysis, the dark-skinned, relatively 
poor immigrant groups at risk of being located in such places 
should use any family resources and strategies they can to 
escape. Otherwise, they will be prone to downward 
assimilation. It is no exaggeration to say that the segmented 
assimilation model portrays native blacks as having the worst 
outcomes.
It is therefore theoretically interesting that the data clearly 
show that African-Americans in New York are not at the 
bottom and that black immigrants, largely from the 
Anglophone Caribbean, are doing even better than native 
blacks. If the causal mechanisms underlying the segmented 
assimilation model are at work, then these groups must have 
more family and community resources to resist and overcome 
racial discrimination than that model suggests. This should 
prompt us to rethink whether black communities do indeed 
constitute such a negative model. In the ISGMNY, West 
Indians are getting more education than African-Americans, 
even after taking their somewhat higher parental levels of 
education and employment into account. So being 
phenotypically black and living near African-Americans may 
not be as much of a barrier as the segmented assimilation 
model seems to posit. Indeed, the substantial levels of 
education and income achieved by many African-Americans in 
New York may provide a positive model, not a negative one.
The data presented here should also lead us to reflect on why 
Hispanic groups, not black groups, seem the most adversely 
affected by the mechanisms of racial and economic inequality 
in New York City. As Massey (2005) notes, Hispanic groups 
occupy an ambiguous position in America’s black-white 
hierarchy and come from societies that have different ways of 
categorizing African ancestry (Itzigsohn 2004; Itzigsohn, 
Giorguli, and Vazquez 2005). Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and 
other Hispanic groups in New York City are clearly not 
comfortable placing themselves along a black-white axis and 
choose “other” on the census race question. It is also clear that 
the Dominican Republic and other sending societies have 
complicated racial classification systems of their own that differ 
from that of the United States. Race cannot be dismissed as a 
factor, but it needs to be understood in light of how African 
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environment to produce even more challenges than simply 
being black or simply speaking Spanish. The fact that the 
census data and the ISGMNY show that Puerto Ricans and 
Dominicans are experiencing the most difficulties should 
prompt more analysis of this question.
Second, we need to dissect more minutely why young adult 
children growing up in South American, Dominican, or West 
Indian immigrant families are going to somewhat better 
schools, achieving somewhat more education, and doing better 
at avoiding arrest and single parenthood than those growing up 
in very similar native Puerto Rican and African-American 
families. For example, West Indians growing up in single-
parent families are half as likely as African-Americans to have 
earned a B.A. at age twenty-five or older, while those growing 
up in two-parent families are twice as likely (Table 8). The 
children of Chinese immigrants, though nonwhite, have 
managed to make extraordinary educational progress despite 
their parents’ low level of education. The segmented 
assimilation model suggests that these patterns reflect the 
immigrant parents’ ability to avoid the poorest, most 
segregated native minority neighborhoods characterized by 
street crime and poor schools. But there may also be other 
factors at work, and we need to specify what they are.
Third, one way forward suggested by this analysis is to focus 
on what we might call multigenerational strategies for 
accumulating capital and transferring it across generations. 
The most successful children come from groups in which 
families often have two parents—as well as other adults—
earning wages and caring for relatively few children. The 
Chinese excel with respect to the ratio of working adults to 
children. While it is true that Chinese parents relentlessly 
expect their children to perform well in school, they also 
provide them with higher household incomes, live in 
neighborhoods with better schools, keep them out of the labor 
force while they study, and find the bureaucratic pathways to 
the best schools in the New York City public school system. 
Children growing up in African-American and Puerto Rican 
families also have parents with relatively low levels of 
education, but they often live in single-income families that 
cannot afford to move out of the poorest neighborhoods with 
the worst performing schools and the highest exposure to 
crime and arrest.
Finally, the Russian and Chinese second generation has 
outdistanced the native white young people who grew up and 
remain in New York City, especially when parental education 
and income are taken into account. Russian parents had very 
high levels of education, but few were able to translate their 
credentials into professional careers, and many spent time on 
public assistance. Though some Chinese parents, such as those 
from Taiwan or Hong Kong, had professional degrees, the 
great majority had low levels of education and little ability to 
speak English. The fact that they have done so well should 
remind us that our native white New Yorkers—often from 
Irish, Italian, or even Jewish working- and lower-middle-class 
backgrounds—faced a good number of obstacles growing up as 
well. Our image of successful young white New Yorkers is 
shaped by how many of them—a third or more—grew up and 
were educated elsewhere and came to New York as young 
adults to make a professional career.
Despite the success of many members of native minority 
groups, the data here present a distressing picture of outcomes 
for many Puerto Ricans and African-Americans in New York 
City. The high levels of poverty and single-parent families 
among the adults show signs of being reproduced in the next 
generation. (Given how many African-Americans grew up in 
single-parent families in segregated settings, their 
accomplishments are all the more remarkable.) Even when 
native white New Yorkers grow up in single-parent families or 
attend poorly performing schools, they have significant 
advantages over their African-American and Puerto Rican 
peers. They are far less likely to have neighbors in the same 
position and far more likely to own their homes or have 
relatives who can tie them into job opportunities. Because it 
encapsulates a complex dynamic of scarce family resources, 
high obstacles to success, and a risky environment, race still 
counts very much in New York City. Just because some 
children of immigrant minority parents can avoid its worst 
effects, that does not lessen the sting on those who cannot.Endnotes
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1. This analysis covers own and related children in families composed 
of householders and their spouses, if any. However, about 8.4 percent 
of the residents of New York City live in subfamilies, that is, the own 
or related children of the household head or spouse have children of 
their own. We do not analyze the experience of these children—the 
grandchildren of the householder—who make up about 2.6 percent 
of New York City’s residents. They would also qualify as members of 
the second generation if their parents—the children of the 
householder—were foreign born.
2. The data are from the 2000 census 5 Percent PUMS for New York 
City and include the individual records on household head; spouse, if 
any; and children in households with one or more own or related 
children.
3. Although my daughter’s experience with the New York City public 
schools highlighted the importance of having parents capable of 
engaging the bureaucracy for me, Philip Kasinitz has emphasized the 
degree to which noncitizenship poses a problem for the children of 
noncitizens. Only half of all immigrant parents become citizens, and 
they are less likely to vote than are native-born parents.
4. Support for the project was provided by the Russell Sage 
Foundation, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the UJA-Federation, and the 
National Institute for Child Health and Human Development. Survey 
data on 4,000 individuals were collected in 1998 and 1999; follow-up 
in-person, in-depth interviews were conducted with a subsample of 
346 individuals in 2000, with 152 reinterviewed in 2002. The Russell 
Sage Foundation funded a counterpart study that gathered data in 
2004: Immigrant Integration in Metropolitan Los Angeles, directed by 
Rubén Rumbaut and Frank Bean of the University of California, 
Irvine; Min Zhou, of the University of California, Los Angeles; and a 
number of their colleagues.
5. These racial categories consolidate as a distinct group Hispanics 
from all races.References
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